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Abstract
Governments across the globe are eager to foster entrepreneurial ecosystems, yet there is no
consensus on what policies to use. We develop a theory about the equilibrium consequences
of two canonical types of entrepreneurship policies: policies that encourage entrepreneurs
to found new ventures, and policies that encourage investors to fund new ventures. We
distinguish between a short-term impact on current market activity, versus a long-term im-
pact on future activity. Investing in entrepreneurial ventures requires tacit knowledge that
is mainly acquired through prior entrepreneurial experience, implying that the supply of
capital depends on successful entrepreneurs from prior generations. Recognizing this in-
tergenerational linkage has a profound impact on the market equilibrium, and the effect of
entrepreneurship policies. Our analysis identifies a rationale for using funding polices.
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1 Introduction
Policy makers across the globe want to foster their entrepreneurial ecosystems. Silicon Val-
ley seems to be the envy of everyone, imitations abound: Silicon Forest (Oregon), Swamp
(Florida), Gorge (UK), Glen (Scotland), Fjord (Norway), Wadi (Israel), Savannah (Kenya),
and many more. The core reasons why policy makers want to promote entrepreneurship are
fairly well understood, they relate mainly to economic growth, employment, and innovation
(see Lerner (2008), Decker et al. (2014),Wilson (2015)). However, there are vast disparities
in the approaches taken by governments to achieve these goals. The questions becomes how
policy makers can foster entrepreneurship?
One common set of approaches focuses on expediting founding, facilitating entry into en-
trepreneurship, and promoting firm formation. Such policies come in a wide variety of forms,
such as training, access to mentoring and expertise, or a reduction of bureaucratic red tape. In
the US, the Small Business Administration (SBA) offers a large variety of training programs for
entrepreneurs, and the I-Corps program of the National Science Foundation (NSF) provides en-
trepreneurship training for scientists and engineers.1 The website of the UK government alone
lists over 250 business support programs for entrepreneurs.2 McKenzie and Woodruff (2014)
summarize various studies on business support programs for entrepreneurs in developing coun-
tries.
A very different set of policies focuses on supporting the funding of entrepreneurial ven-
tures. These policies use a variety of methods to encourage investors to channel more funding
into start-ups. In the US, the SBIC program supports the funding of early-stage start-ups, and
according to the Angel Capital Association, more than half of all US states have some tax credits
for angel investing.3 In the UK angel investors receive generous tax credits under the EIS/SEIS
program.4 New Zealand has a government fund that matches private angel investments.5 Wil-
son and Silva (2013) provide a comprehensive discussion of government policies for early-stage
funding across the OECD.
Applied policy analysis typically focuses on evaluating the effectiveness of specific pro-
grams in isolation, but there is limited emphasis on contrasting policies, and asking what type
of policies would be most effective. We therefore raise the fundamental question of how differ-
1See https://www.sba.gov/starting-managing-business and https://www.nsf.gov/news/special_reports/i-corps/
2https://www.gov.uk/business-finance-support-finder/search?support_types%5B%5D=expertise-and-
advice&postcode=&business_sizes=&sectors=&stages=
3See https://www.sba.gov/sbic and https://www.angelcapitalassociation.org/aca-public-policy-state-program-
details/
4https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/the-enterprise-investment-scheme-introduction
5See http://www.nzvif.co.nz/what-we-offer/seed-co-investment-fund and
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ent entrepreneurship policies compare in terms of their impact on entrepreneurial ecosystems.
We tackle this question with a formal theory model that derives and contrasts the equilibrium
impact of different government policies. Specifically we ask how different policies promote
entrepreneurial activity, distinguishing between (i) founding policies that affect what is often
called the ‘demand-side’, i.e., the number of entrepreneurs demanding capital, versus (ii) fund-
ing policies that affect the supply of funds to new ventures.
Based on a large prior entrepreneurial finance literature (see Da Rin et al. (2003)), we ac-
knowledge that the financing of entrepreneurial ventures is different from standard financial
investments and requires ‘smart money’. Specifically it requires tacit knowledge about the en-
trepreneurial process that is mostly acquired by going through the entrepreneurial process itself.
We view so-called ‘angel’ investing as the natural process by which experienced entrepreneurs
pass on their knowledge to the next generation of entrepreneurs. In practice, the first check of
successful start-ups often comes from angel investors who were successful entrepreneurs be-
fore: think of Andy Bechtolsheim, co-founder of Sun Microsytems, who wrote the first check
for Google, or Peter Thiel, co-founder of PayPal, who wrote the first check for Facebook. We
use an ‘overlapping generations’ model to account for the accumulation of expertise in an en-
trepreneurial ecosystem. Early in their career entrepreneurs start new ventures that may succeed
or fail. Successful entrepreneurs accumulate both the expertise and the wealth to then fund the
next generation of entrepreneurs. This creates dynamic interlinkages between generations of en-
trepreneurs, where the supply of angel capital is a function of the number of past entrepreneurs
and the wealth they accumulated.
Promoting entrepreneurship is not a short term endeavor. Silicon Valley took decades to
become what it is today; its imitators had to learn how long it takes to create an entrepreneurial
ecosystem (Lerner (2008)). Our dynamic model allows us to examine both the short term and
the long term impacts of entrepreneurial policies. We first build a simple Walrasian model of
the demand and supply for capital to fund new ventures, without any intergenerational linkages.
We establish several important benchmark results. Comparable levels of founding and funding
subsidies generate the same increase in entrepreneurial activity. However, founding policies
create a competitive dynamic where more entrepreneurs seek a limited supply of funds, resulting
in less favorable investment terms for entrepreneurs, i.e., lower valuations. By contrast, funding
policies create a more abundant supply of capital which results in more favorable investment
terms for entrepreneurs, i.e. higher valuations. We then introduce intergenerational linkages and
show that the differences in valuations have important dynamic implications. This is because
the wealth created by one generation of entrepreneurs determines the supply of angel capital
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for the next generation of entrepreneurs. A central result is that for increasing entrepreneurial
activity, funding subsidies are more effective than founding subsidies.
Our model also generates some interesting predictions about the dynamic path of entrepreneurial
ecosystems. While there is always a unique equilibrium in every period, the model with inter-
generational linkages can have multiple steady state equilibria (to which the period equilibria
converge to). In the low (high) steady state equilibrium the lack (abundance) of entrepreneurial
activity prevents (enables) the formation of angel capital for future generations, thus perpetuat-
ing the low (high) level of entrepreneurial activity. We show that even in the high steady state
equilibrium there is too little entrepreneurial activity relative to the first best outcome. This is
because future entrepreneurs benefit from the wealth of earlier generations, but this intergenera-
tional externality is not taken into account by investors when striking a deal with entrepreneurs.
In the low equilibrium there is an additional rationale for government support, namely to pro-
vide temporary subsidies to lift the economy above a critical threshold, beyond which there is a
self-sustaining dynamic path toward the high equilibrium.
In our model funding subsidies are the optimal policy, but they can be implemented in sev-
eral ways. One of them is to subsidize investments (such as an investment tax credit), another is
to subsidize returns (such as a relief from capital gains taxation). We also show that if investors
need to screen out good from bad projects, funding policies have the advantage of being applied
only to those projects that have passed the investors’ screen.
We extensively discuss the implications from our model for entrepreneurship policies, look-
ing first at how policies affect a single ecosystem in isolation, and then looking at ‘open econ-
omy’ issues that allow for capital and labor mobility across ecosystems. We also provide an
extensive discussion of how our analysis can guide future theoretical and empirical.
Our model suggests a societal benefit to having wealthy entrepreneurs, and a benefit of
giving tax credits to ‘already-rich’ angel investors. At first sight this argument runs contrary to
Piketty’s (2014) argument about the harms of wealth inequality. However, our model does not
suggest a blanket tax-exemption for the rich. Instead our argument is to create effective channels
for rich entrepreneurs to reinvest their wealth (and their expertise) into the next generation of
poor entrepreneurs. As such our argument focuses on creating a channel for social mobility.
This argument is related to the recent work of Aghion et al. (2015) concerning the broader
relationship between innovation and top income inequality.
Our paper relates to a diverse set of prior literatures. There is a large literature discussing the
differences in entrepreneurship across ecosystems, starting with the seminal work by Saxenian
(1994); Lerner and Schoar (2010) contains a more recent overview. In terms of theory, the
closest work are formal entrepreneurship theories with multiple equilibria, such as Canidio and
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Legros (2015) and Landier (2006). In terms of theories that examine how government policies
affect entrepreneurs and investors, seminal contributions include Poterba (1989a, 1989b), and
the work of Keuschnigg and Nielsen (2003, 2004). More recent contributions include Di Maio
et al. (2016) and Egger and Keuschnigg (2015). None of this focuses on the comparison of
founding versus funding policies.
A large prior literature looks at the dynamics of entrepreneurship. One important strand
looks at the origin of entrepreneurial activities in terms of spin-offs from established companies.
Relevant theories include Cassiman and Ueda (2006), Hellmann and Perotti (2011), and Rauch
(2015). Important empirical works include Agarwal et al. (2004), Gompers et al. (2005), and
Klepper and Sleeper (2005). Another strand looks at the role of serial entrepreneurs, including
Hsu (2007), Gompers et al. (2010), and Lafontaine and Shaw (2016). Our specific interest here
is a slightly different dynamic transition that has received less attention, namely the transition
from entrepreneur to angel investor. The recent empirical explorations of Guiso et al. (2015)
and Cumming et al. (2016) are a useful step in that direction. As a background, the work of
Van Osnabrugge and Robinson (2000) and Wilson (2011) provide useful overviews of angel
investing.
There is a growing policy literature on the merits of entrepreneurship policies. Lerner (2008)
and Audretsch et al. (2007) provide an extensive coverage of this topic, including a discussion
of the pitfalls of misguided policies. Wilson and Silva (2013) and Wilson (2015) summarize a
large body of research about the experience of OECD countries with entrepreneurship policies.
The work of Leleux and Surlemont (2003) and Brander et al. (2015) empirically evaluates one
important class of funding programs, namely government-supported venture capital. Our paper
is also related to the broader literature on innovation and agglomeration, see Delgado et al.
(2010), Ellison et al. (2010), and Glaeser et al. (2010).
We explain our theory in Section 2, but relegate much of the formal analysis to the On-
line Appendix, which is available on the authors’ websites. Section 3 provides an extensive
discussion of the implications of the model. It is followed by a brief conclusion.
2 Main Model
2.1 Base Assumptions
Consider an overlapping generations model where all parties are risk-neutral and share the
discount factor δ ∈ (0, 1). In each period t there is a continuous unit mass of potential en-
trepreneurs that are considering starting a new venture. Entrepreneurs have no initial wealth
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and face a non-monetary entry cost denoted by l (see Jovanovic (1982)). For simplicity as-
sume that l has a uniform distribution with support [0, µE]; the cumulative distribution function
is denoted by ΓE(l). The number of entrepreneurs actually starting a venture in period t is a
continuous measure denoted by nE,t; whenever possible we simply write nE .
Each entrepreneur lives for three periods. In period 1, she starts a new ventures; we describe
the main properties below. If the venture is successful, the entrepreneur has some wealth that
she can invest in period 2. In period 3 she consumes the returns of all her investments.6
In period 1 the entrepreneur requires a financial investment φ > 0. This is provided by a
set of investors (described below) in exchange for an equity stake α. The venture succeeds with
probability ρ, generating a payoff y > 0. With probability 1− ρ the venture fails, generating a
zero payoff. In case of failure the entrepreneur has no more wealth, and plays no further role in
the model.
We call the market for funding entrepreneurs the ‘angel market’ and assume for simplicity
that it is characterized by symmetric information and competitive pricing. Moreover, investors
can freely combine their investments to ensure that total capital demand equals total capital sup-
ply. However, we assume that only a limited set of investors have the required skills to invest
in the angel market. Specifically we consider two types of angel investors. First there are ‘en-
trepreneurial angels’ who are formerly successful entrepreneurs (period 1), and have therefore
acquired the necessary skills for angel investing. Second, there are ‘external angels’ who are
wealthy individuals, and who also have the required skills for angel investing. In Section 3.2
we argue that such external angels can be successful entrepreneurs from other entrepreneurial
ecosystems (such as Silicon Valley), wealthy senior executives from established corporations
or financial institutions, or other professionals. The key distinction is that the number of en-
trepreneurial angels arises endogenously within our model, whereas external angels appear ex-
ogenously in every period. Specifically, the number of entrepreneurial angels is determined by
the number of entrepreneurs that succeeded in the previous period, so that nA,t = ρnE,t−1. Their
individual wealth is endogenously determined by their ownership in their prior entrepreneurial
ventures, so that wt = (1 − αt−1)y. The number of external angels is exogenously given by n˜
and their individual wealth is denoted by w˜.
In period 2 a formerly successful entrepreneur can invest her wealth wt. First, we assume
there is a safe asset that generates a safe return 1+r. We use the standard assumption that 1+r =
6In our base model we assume that each entrepreneur has only one period for starting a venture, and only one
period for investing her wealth. In the Online Appendix we consider a model extension where entrepreneurs can
start multiple ventures over multiple periods (serial entrepreneurs) and can invest over multiple periods (serial
investors). We show that the main insights of the base model remain intact.
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1/δ. Second, there is the possibility of investing in the next generation of period 1 entrepreneurs
(angel investing). We denote the amount of angel investing by k so that an entrepreneurial angel
invests k ∈ [0, wt] in new ventures, and invests the remaining wt − k in the safe asset. We
assume that angel investing involves some private costs. These can be thought of as legal and
due diligence costs, as well as the opportunity cost of time and the personal preferences for
engaging in angel investing. Specifically we assume that each successful entrepreneur has a
monetary cost θk of making angel investments, where θ is drawn from a uniform distribution
with support [0, µI ]; the cumulative distribution function is denoted by ΓI(θ). For the external
angels we use parallel assumptions: They invest k˜ in new ventures, and the remaining amount
w˜− k˜ in the safe asset. The aggregate amount of wealth potentially available for angel investing
in period t is therefore given by nA,twt + n˜w˜; however, aggregate amount actually invested in
entrepreneurial ventures will depend on the expected returns to angel investing, which will be
derived as part of the market equilibrium.
Central to our argument is that angel investing requires unique skills that cannot be taken for
granted in an ecosystem. The most natural source for acquiring such skills is to go through the
entrepreneurial experience itself, and then use the experience, as well as the acquired wealth,
to fund the next generation of entrepreneurs. Note that it is the combination of entrepreneurial
experience and wealth that creates the entrepreneurial angels. Unsuccessful entrepreneurs may
or may not have useful skills, but they lack the wealth to become angel investors. To avoid mak-
ing our model over-restrictive we allow for the possibility that others also possess the necessary
skills for angel investing, hence the external angels. For some parts of the model we set n˜ = 0,
in order to focus on the endogenous determination of angel markets. For other parts we allow
for n˜ > 0, to consider the more general setting where there is also an autonomous supply of
angel capital.
We formally derive all proofs in the Online Appendix. For the main paper we provide
more intuitive explanations of the different equilibrium outcomes using traditional demand and
supply graphs.
2.2 Benchmark Model Without Intergenerational Dynamics
As a building block it is useful to consider a model where there are no entrepreneurial angels
(e.g., all successful entrepreneurs invest in the safe asset). We can think of this benchmark
model as a repeated static Walrasian equilibrium model with no intergenerational effects.
Consider the optimal investment decision of external angels. In exchange for investing
the amount φ, investors receive an ownership stake α, which generates the expected return
6
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Figure 1: Benchmark Model – Market Equilibrium
ραy. From the perspective of an individual angel this means that investing an amount k in en-
trepreneurial ventures generates an expected return of k
φ
αρy. The expected utility of an external
angel is thus given by
UI(k) = δ
k
φ
αρy − θk + δ(1 + r)(w˜ − k).
In the Online Appendix we show that there exists a critical level θ̂, such that for θ ≤ θ̂ it is
optimal for external angels to invest their entire wealth in new ventures (k∗ = w˜), and for θ > θ̂
it is optimal to invest their entire wealth in the safe asset (k∗ = 0). The threshold is given by
θ̂ = α δρy
φ
− 1, which is an increasing function of the ownership share α, and the venture’s net
economic return δρy
φ
. The aggregate supply of angel capital is thus given by n˜w˜ΓI(θ̂).
Now consider the demand for capital from entrepreneurs that are entering the market. An
entrepreneur’s expected utility of starting a venture is given by UE = δρ(1 − α)y. This has to
be traded off against the cost of entry l. Clearly, entry is optimal as long as UE ≥ l, so that the
number of entrepreneurs (which is a continuous measure) is given by nE = ΓE (UE) – we call
this the entry condition.
The total amount of capital that all entrepreneurs demand is given by φnE . In equilibrium
this must equal to the total capital supply, resulting in the following market clearing condition:
φnE = n˜w˜ΓI(θ̂).
Consider Figure 1. On the vertical axis we put α, a measure of investor ownership and
the effective price of capital. On the horizontal axis we put nE , the relevant quantity variable,
namely the number of funded entrepreneurs. The demand curve is downward sloping, because
fewer entrepreneurs want to enter with a higher price of capital, as reflected by a higher investor
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ownership stake α. The supply curve is upward sloping, because more investors want to invest
in the angel market when the net returns are higher.
We can also interpret Figure 1 using the concept of valuation. The so-called post-money
valuation of a venture investment is defined as φ/α, so that a higher α corresponds to a lower
valuation. Entrepreneurs prefer higher valuations, investors prefer lower valuations. As α in-
creases, entrepreneurs’ utilities decrease and the demand slopes downwards, but investor’s util-
ities increase and the supply slopes upwards.
The comparative statics of the market equilibrium are very intuitive. The equilibrium level
of entrepreneurial activity n∗E is increasing in the probability of success ρ, the success value y,
the number of external angels n˜, and their levels of wealth w˜; it is decreasing in the required
amount of capital φ, the average entry cost of entrepreneurs µE/2, and the average entry cost
of investors µI/2. The investor’s ownership stake α∗ is increasing in φ and µI/2, and it is
decreasing in n˜, w˜, µE/2, ρ, and y.
To examine whether the market equilibrium is efficient, we compare it with the first best
equilibrium that maximizes the sum of all utilities. In addition, we are interested in the effects
of two alternative types of government subsidies. The first subsidy targets the demand side by
subsidizing founding, the second subsidy targets the supply side by subsidizing funding. We
discuss the interpretation of these policies in Section 3.
We define a founding subsidy as an in-kind support to potential entrepreneurs that want to
start a venture. The subsidy specifically reduces the non-monetary cost of entry by SE , which
implies that entry is now optimal as long as UE ≥ l − SE . The entry condition becomes
nE = ΓE(UE + SE), so that founding subsidies increase entry, and therefore increase the
demand for capital. We assume that the government cannot discriminate among entrepreneurs
with different values of l, so that all entrepreneurs that want to enter can take advantage of the
subsidy.7
We define a funding subsidy as a financial support to potential investors that want to invest
in new ventures. For now we consider a simple tax-credit of sI for every unit of investment;
Section 2.7 then looks at alternative funding policies. When investing k, an investor therefore
receives a total tax credit of ksI . This changes the cost of angel investing to (θ − sI)k. The
market clearing condition then becomes φnE = n˜w˜ΓI(θ̂+sI), so that funding subsidies increase
the supply of angel capital. Again we assume that the government cannot discriminate among
investors with different values of θ, so that all investors take advantage of the subsidy. It is
useful to define SI ≡ φsI as the absolute subsidy amount per firm.
7In the case of l < SE we simply assume that the entrants’ cost of entry remains zero, but that the government
still pays the full cost.
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Figure 2: Benchmark Model – Effect of Subsidies
We now state useful benchmark results concerning the efficiency of the market equilibrium,
as well as the effects of demand-side versus supply-side polices.
Proposition 1 Consider the benchmark model without intergenerational dynamics.
(i) The competitive equilibrium is socially efficient.
(ii) The effect of a demand-side founding subsidy (SE) is to increase the equilibrium number
of entrepreneurs (n∗E), and to increase the investor’s ownership stake (α
∗).
(iii) The effect of a supply-side funding subsidy (SI) is to increase the equilibrium number of
entrepreneurs (n∗E), and to decrease the investor’s ownership stake (α
∗).
(iv) Equivalent levels of founding and funding subsidies (SE = SI) result in equivalent equi-
librium numbers of entrepreneurs (n∗E(SE) = n
∗
E(SI)), but in different ownership stakes
(α∗(SE) > α∗(SI)).
Figure 2 accompanies Proposition 1, showing in Panel A the effect of a founding policies
(SE), and in Panel B the effect of funding policy (SI). Our first result is that the competitive
equilibrium is efficient. This is not surprising, because the benchmark model is a standard
competitive Walrasian equilibrium model with no externalities. While there is no rationale for
government intervention, it is still instructive to look at the effects of the various subsidies. We
find that both policies are effective in raising the equilibrium level of entrepreneurial activity:
founding subsidies by shifting the demand curve, and funding subsidies by shifting the supply
curve.
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An important finding is that the two policies create different equilibrium investment terms.
Founding policies create relatively more favorable terms for investors, as they lead to relatively
higher ownership stakes α∗ (i.e., lower valuations). At first glance one might have expected
that funding policies would be more favorable for investors, because investors receive a sub-
sidy. However, our equilibrium analysis suggests an interesting alternative mechanism. With a
founding subsidy, more entrepreneurs enter the market and seek funding. A founding subsidy
therefore creates a competitive dynamic where entrepreneurs bid up the stakes they are willing
to give to investors in exchange for funding, thus resulting in lower valuations. By contrast, a
funding subsidy brings more investors into the market, creating a competitive dynamic where
investors bid up valuations, and therefore end up with lower equity stakes.
The last part of Proposition 1 states that comparable subsidy levels (SE = SI) generate
identical levels of entrepreneurial activity (n∗E(SE) = n
∗
E(SI)). However, the mechanisms
behind founding and funding subsidies are fundamentally different, as the former affect the
non-monetary cost of entering the market for entrepreneurs, whereas the latter affect the invest-
ment terms obtained after entering the market. More importantly, this ‘equivalence result’ only
applies to the benchmark model, and will not be true in our main model with intergenerational
dynamics.
It is worth pointing out that the equivalence result in Proposition 1 is fundamentally different
from the well-known ‘tax incidence equivalence’ result that says that the burden of a tax (or
subsidy) on buyers and sellers is independent of who nominally pays the tax (or receives the
subsidy). In the Online Appendix we show how the usual ‘tax incidence equivalence’ result
applies in our context. In particular, it does not matter whether the funding subsidy SI is given
to the investor or the entrepreneur. This is because the nominal ’price’ α readjusts to generate
the same real price, irrespective of who nominally receives the subsidy. We discuss this further
in Section 2.7. The above equivalence result of founding and funding policies is different from
the tax incidence equivalence result because the founding subsidy pertains to an entry decision
that happens at an earlier point in time than the funding subsidy.
2.3 Model With Intergenerational Dynamics
In this section we bring in intergenerational dynamics by introducing entrepreneurial angels.
Specifically, we now allow successful entrepreneurs to invest their wealth into the next genera-
tion of entrepreneurs. To identify the main effects of intergenerational dynamics, we temporar-
ily assume that there are no external angels, i.e., n˜ = 0. In Section 2.5 we will bring them back
in.
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Figure 3: Dynamic Model – Equilibria
The optimal investment decision of entrepreneurial angels is the same as for external angels
(obvious differences in notation apart). The important difference is that now the number of
angels is no longer exogenously given by n˜, but instead depends on the number of successful
entrepreneurs from the previous period. Formally, the number of entrepreneurial angels actually
investing in new ventures in period t is given by nA,t = ΓI(θ̂)ρnE,t−1. The market clearing
condition is then given by nE,tφ = nA,t(1− αt−1)y.
Another important change in the model with entrepreneurial angels concerns the expected
utility of becoming an entrepreneur, which now includes not only the returns from the en-
trepreneurial activity itself, but also the returns from future angel investing. Specifically the
expected utility is now given by
UE,t = δρ (1− αt) y
[∫ θ̂t+1
0
(
αt+1
δρy
φ
− θ
)
dΓI(θ) +
∫ µI
θ̂t+1
dΓI(θ)
]
,
with θ̂t+1 = αt+1 δρyφ − 1. This expression is then used in the entry condition nE,t = ΓE(UE,t).
The intergenerational model has a unique equilibrium in each period, and also converges
to some steady state equilibrium over time. However, there can be more than one steady state
equilibrium. In the Online Appendix we fully characterize the equilibrium for each period,
{n∗E,t(nE,t−1);α∗t (nE,t−1)}, and its dynamic properties. In the main text we refer to Figure 3,
which illustrates the dynamic evolution of the key state variable n∗E,t(nE,t−1). The S-shaped
curve in Figure 3 starts at the origin, and has a strictly positive slope. Intuitively, more en-
trepreneurial activity in the previous period creates a larger pool of potential angels, which
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Figure 4: Dynamic Model – Capital Supply and Demand
results in a higher level of entrepreneurial activity in the current period. However, the slope of
the curve varies and may be less than 1, suggesting that a unit increase in the past activity may
result in less than a unit increase in the current period.
In a steady state we have n∗E,t = n
∗
E,t−1; this is where the S-curve intersects the 45 degree
line, as shown in Figure 3. Clearly, this always happens at the origin where n∗E,t = n
∗
E,t−1 = 0.
The question is whether there are further intersections so that n∗E,t = n
∗
E,t−1 > 0? This happens
in Panel B of Figure 3, but not in Panel A. In the Online Appendix we formally show that there
exists a critical investment level φ̂ ∈ (0, δρy) such that for φ > φ̂ only the low steady state
equilibrium n∗E,t = n
∗
E,t−1 = 0 exists (as shown in Panel A), but for φ < φ̂ three steady state
equilibria exist (as shown in Panel B). Moreover, standard dynamic analysis reveals that the
lowest and the highest equilibria are stable, but the middle one is unstable. We can therefore
limit our focus on the low and high equilibrium.8
To better understand the structure of these equilibria, consider Figure 4 which illustrates the
demand and supply functions. The demand curve (E) looks similar to the one for the benchmark
model as shown in Figure 1. Even though the entrepreneur’s utility function UE,t is now more
complicated, as it includes the returns to angel investing, we show in the Online Appendix that
the demand function continues to be downward sloping. The supply function (I), however,
becomes non-monotonic. Initially it is upward sloping for the same reason that it is upward
sloping in Figure 1, namely that higher returns induce angels to invest more. However, there
is an important countervailing effect that becomes dominant for larger values of α. Giving
8For φ = φ̂ two equilibria exist, the low one is stable, the high one unstable. In the Online Appendix we further
show that given uniform distributions for l and θ, the maximum number of equilibria is three.
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investors a higher equity share also means leaving entrepreneurs with a lower share. This has
no effect on the total wealth available for investments in a model without intergenerational
linkages. With such linkages, however, it means that entrepreneurial angels have less wealth to
invest. That is, a higher share for investors means better returns to current angel investors, but
also less wealth for future angel investors. The second effect can dominate, thus causing the
supply curve to bend backwards. Indeed, as α approaches 1, the supply curve falls back to zero.
This is for the simple reason that at α = 1, successful entrepreneurs generate no wealth, and
therefore have nothing to invest.
Panel A of Figure 4 shows the case of φ > φ̂, and Panel B the case of φ < φ̂. The
difference between Panel A and Panel B is that in Panel A the supply curve begins to slope
backwards relatively early, before ever intersecting with the demand curve. In this case the
only equilibrium is the low equilibrium, as depicted in Panel A of Figure 3. In Panel B the
supply curve intersects the demand curve before sloping down again. This is what creates the
three equilibria depicted in Panel B of Figure 3. The intuition for why the existence of a high
equilibrium requires lower capital needs can be obtained from Figure 3. For a given number
of old entrepreneurs (nE,t−1), lower values of φ permit a greater number of new entrepreneurs
(nE,t) to be funded. This means that in Figure 3 lower values of φ lift the S-curve up. In
Figure 4, this gets translated into a leftward shift of the supply curve, again representing a
greater number of new entrepreneurs (nE,t). It follows that multiple equilibria can only exist
for sufficiently low values of φ, as shown in Panel B of Figures 3 and 4.
2.4 The Effect of Government Subsidies
We now consider the effects of founding and funding subsidies in the model with intergener-
ational dynamics. We focus first on the high steady state equilibrium; in Section 2.6 we also
consider the low equilibrium.
As a first step we again ask whether there is indeed a role for the government to intervene
in the market. For this we compare the high steady state equilibrium (denoted by {n∗E;α∗})
with the first best equilibrium (denoted by {nfbE ;αfb}) that maximizes the steady state sum of
all expected utilities (i.e., total welfare).
Proposition 2 The high steady state equilibrium does not maximize welfare. It has too few
entrepreneurial ventures (i.e., n∗E < n
fb
E ) and investors get too much equity (i.e., α
∗ > αfb).
This result stands in sharp contrast to the benchmark model where the competitive equi-
librium is efficient. In the model with intergenerational dynamics, there is an intertemporal
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externality. Future entrepreneurs need experienced angel investors, and therefore rely on the
wealth creation of past generations of entrepreneurs. We find that relative to the first best level,
there is insufficient entrepreneurial wealth creation: Investors get too much equity, so that suc-
cessful entrepreneurs have too little wealth that can be reinvested in the next generation of
entrepreneurs. This result provides a rationale for directed government action, provided the
cost of intervention is not too high (see Section 2.8).
Again we consider the effect of founding and funding subsidies, now allowing for intergen-
erational dynamics. In the Online Appendix we re-derive the entry and market clearing condi-
tions with subsidies for the model with entrepreneurial angels. In the main text we directly state
our findings.
Proposition 3 The effect of a founding subsidy SE is to increase the level of entrepreneurial
activity (i.e., dn∗E(SE)/dSE > 0). However, there is no effect on the equilibrium ownership
stake (i.e., dα∗(SE)/dSE = 0).
The first part of Proposition 3 is intuitive: founding subsidies lower barriers to entry and
therefore encourage more entrepreneurs to start new ventures. This corresponds to an upward
shift of the demand curve. In the model with intergenerational linkages, more entry also in-
creases the number of successful entrepreneurs that become angel investors. This causes the
supply curve to shift upwards, which further increases the equilibrium level of entrepreneurial
activity. In equilibrium the demand and supply effect reinforce each other and create a robust
positive effect on the level of entrepreneurial activity.
The second part of Proposition 3 is more surprising, namely that founding subsidies have
no price effect. This is in contrast with the findings from the model without intergenerational
linkages, where founding subsidies were associated with higher ownership stakes (i.e., lower
valuations). As in Proposition 1, the demand shift increases the ownership stake, but the new
supply shift decreases the equilibrium stake. Moreover, we note that the ratio of entrepreneurs
to angels always remains the same in the high steady state equilibrium, irrespective of the level
of the founding subsidy SE . This ratio ultimately defines the equilibrium shares by balancing
total capital demand and supply. The demand and supply effect therefore exactly offset each
other, so that ownership stakes remain constant in the dynamic model.9
9It is worth noting that this particular result depends on the assumption of n̂ = 0. Once we allow for some
external angels (see the discussion in Section 2.5), the ratio of entrepreneurs to angels changes with SE , and we
find again that ownership shares for investors increase with founding subsidies, i.e., dα∗(SE)/dSE > 0.
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Proposition 4 The effect of a funding subsidy SI is to increase the level of entrepreneurial
activity (i.e., dn∗E(SI)/dSI > 0). In addition, it decreases the equilibrium ownership stake (i.e.,
dα∗(SI)/dSI < 0).
Proposition 4 shows that funding policies also increase the level of entrepreneurial activity.
They clearly shift the supply curve upwards as the subsidy increases the net return to angel
investing. They also shift the demand curve. Entry becomes more attractive not only because
of a lower α (which represents a movement along the demand curve), but also because the
subsidy increases the rewards to being a successful entrepreneur, who can take advantage of the
subsidies once becoming an angel investor. Again the demand and supply effect reinforce each
other to increase the equilibrium level of entrepreneurial activity.
Unlike in Proposition 3, however, there is an equilibrium effect on ownership stakes, which
are reduced by higher subsidies. This is in line with the findings from Proposition 1. Specifi-
cally, funding subsidies encourage more potential angel investors to actually invest in new ven-
tures, as reflected by the threshold value θ̂ + 1
φ
SI . This increases the number of active angels
relative to the number of entrepreneurs, and therefore results in lower equilibrium ownership
stakes for angel investors.
We are finally in a position to address the key question of how the two policies compare.
Proposition 5 Consider a founding and a funding subsidy at equivalent levels of subsidization,
so that SI = SE > 0. In the steady state the funding subsidy generates a higher level of
entrepreneurial activity than the founding subsidy, i.e., n∗E(SI) > n
∗
E(SE). It also generates a
lower level of investor ownership, i.e., α∗(SI) < α∗(SE).
Proposition 5 stands in sharp contrast to Proposition 1 where we found that the two policies
did not generate different levels of entrepreneurial activities. This is no longer true in the pres-
ence of intergenerational linkages. Funding subsidies generate a higher level of entrepreneurial
activity than founding subsidies, precisely because of their long-term intergenerational impact.
Funding policies ultimately benefit entrepreneurs by increasing valuations (i.e., lowering α).
Having entrepreneurs retaining larger ownership stakes increases the amount of wealth that
they can invest in the next generation of entrepreneurs. This creates a virtuous cycle that per-
manently increases entrepreneurial activity.
2.5 Model With External and Entrepreneurial Angels
The analysis of Sections 2.3 and 2.4 assumed no external angels; we now bring them back,
i.e., n˜ > 0. The only difference worth mentioning is that the result of dα∗(SE)/dSE = 0 in
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Figure 5: Dynamic Model – Equilibria with External Angels
Proposition 3 no longer applies. Once we allow for some external angels we find again that
ownership increases with founding subsidies, i.e., dα∗(SE)/dSE > 0.
The most interesting analysis concerns the comparative statics of increasing the number of
external angels (n˜). The effects are illustrated in Figure 5. Panel A shows a small increase in
external angels, and Panel B shows a large increase. An increase in n˜ shifts up the entire supply
curve but does not affect demand. For the high steady state equilibrium we find that this results
in higher entry levels and lower ownership stakes. This is an intuitive finding, as the effect
of external angels is to add capital into the market, thereby increasing quantities and lowering
prices.
The low steady state equilibrium also becomes more interesting, as it is no longer fixed at
the origin. The presence of external angels ensures that there is always some supply of capital.
Moreover, it is easy to show that the low equilibrium has the same comparative statics as the
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high equilibrium. In the Online Appendix we explain how the results from Propositions 3, 4
and 5 can also be applied to a low equilibrium. Finally note that in Panel B the supply curve
shifts sufficiently to eliminate the low steady state equilibrium entirely. We return to this case
in Section 3.2, where we interpret the external angels as foreign investors.
2.6 Catalyst Government Policies
So far we examined how government policies locally affect the steady state equilibria. In the
presence of multiple equilibria, there is also a question of whether and how government policies
can help to switch equilibria. In this section we briefly show how subsidies can be used to move
an economy from the low to the high steady state equilibrium.
Our steady state analysis naturally focuses on steady state subsidies, which are permanent
policies. To study how government policies can help the economy to reach the high equilibrium,
it is natural to consider temporary subsidies. Let us consider a situation where the economy is
in the low steady state equilibrium as depicted in Panel A of Figure 5 – alternatively we can
also start with the economy anywhere else below the middle steady state equilibrium nME . Now
suppose that the government is considering a temporary subsidy to push the economy towards
the high equilibrium. Standard dynamic analysis reveals that an economy converges to the
high (low) equilibrium whenever the current level of activity nE,t lies above (below) the critical
threshold nME , the unstable middle equilibrium.
What is the difference between using a temporary founding or funding subsidy? The key
issue is their dynamic effect on future market outcomes. From Proposition 1 we know that a
funding subsidy creates wealthier entrepreneurs that have more to invest in the next generation
of entrepreneurs. It is therefore easy to see that a temporary funding policy advances the econ-
omy further towards the critical threshold than a founding policy. The key insight is that what
matters is not only increasing the current level of entrepreneurial activity, but also increasing
the amount of wealth available to entrepreneurial angels. Consequently we find that the same
logic that made funding subsidies powerful in the high steady state equilibrium also applies to
catalyst policies for pushing the economy towards the high equilibrium.
2.7 On the Optimality of Funding Subsidies
Our main model focuses on two prominent classes of entrepreneurship policies: policies tar-
geted at encouraging entrepreneurial entry, and policies targeted at facilitating the financing
of entrepreneurial ventures. This allows us to identify the key economic properties of demand-
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based versus supply-based policy approaches within a dynamic entrepreneurial ecosystem. Em-
pirically, there many different types of entrepreneurship policies used by governments around
the globe; we discuss this further in Section 3. From a theory perspective, the question here is
whether funding policies are always optimal within the current model.
In the Online Appendix we show that a funding subsidy is an optimal subsidy within our
model. To be specific, we assume that the government can only offer non-discriminatory poli-
cies that cannot offer differential subsidies to different entrepreneurs or angel investors. We
first show that relative to a founding subsidy, a funding subsidy achieves not only higher activ-
ity levels, but also higher levels of social welfare (as measured by the sum of all utilities). We
then show that within the constraints of our model, there are no other subsidies that can achieve
higher social welfare levels for a given government budget. Obviously our model only allows
for a limited set of potential government policies. In reality governments can naturally call upon
a much richer set of policies. We discuss this further in Section 3.
There is one interesting twist to this argument. So far we have expressed funding subsidies
in terms of investment subsidies. We now go one step further and show that we could also think
of funding policies as return subsidies. That is, in our model funding subsidies are optimal, but
they can be implemented equally as investment or return subsidies. Let us explain.
Return subsidies affect the payoff from a venture in case of success, given by y in the model.
Capital gains reliefs are a prominent example for this class of subsidies: Many governments
offer some kind of preferential treatment for capital gains from entrepreneurial ventures; the
US Small Business Jobs Act of 2010 is a recent example. Similarly, corporate tax rates and
other business taxes can also affect the returns to entrepreneurial ventures.
To model the effect of return subsidies, suppose the government can provide direct or indi-
rect support that increases the returns of a venture from y to y + τ . We note that entrepreneurs
and investors only benefit from this subsidy when their ventures succeed. From an ex-ante per-
spective, the discounted expected value from the return subsidy is given by SR = δρτ . We can
then compare return subsidies (SR) with founding (SE) and funding (SI) subsidies.
In the Online Appendix we derive three main results about the properties of return sub-
sidies. First, for the benchmark model without dynamic linkages, we find that larger return
subsidies lead to more entry (dn∗E(SR)/dSR > 0) and lower ownership stakes for investors
(dα∗(SR)/dSR < 0). Moreover, we extend the equivalence result from Proposition 1 by show-
ing that return subsidies achieve the same level of entrepreneurial activity as comparable found-
ing or funding subsidies (i.e., n∗E(SR) = n
∗
E(SE) = n
∗
E(SI) for all SR = SE = SI). Second,
we show that larger return subsidies also increase entry and decrease ownership stakes in the
dynamic model with intergenerational linkages. Finally we show that return and funding sub-
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sidies have in fact identical properties, in the sense that equivalent subsidy levels (SR = SI)
generate the same equilibrium level of entrepreneurial activity (n∗E(SR) = n
∗
E(SI)), and even
the same expected level of entrepreneurial wealth w∗. The reason for this last result is that
both policies create the same expected net value for the entrepreneurial venture, as given by
δρy − φ + SR + SI . The equilibrium allocation of this net value between the entrepreneur
and investor is then determined by the same underlying market forces, irrespective of whether
funding or return subsidies are used.
We conclude that the key distinction in our model is between founding policies that affect
the cost of entry, versus funding policies that affect the value of the entrepreneurial venture after
entry. The optimal funding policies can be structured as either investment or return subsidies.
2.8 Comparing the Costs of Subsidies
Proposition 5 shows that funding policies create higher levels of entrepreneurship than founding
policies. From the perspective of a government, however, there is also the question of which
subsidies cost more to deliver. It is easy to see that funding policies are always optimal if
they are less expensive to administer than founding policies, and continue to be optimal even
if they are slightly more expensive. Beyond treating the costs as exogenous, however, we now
ask if our model suggests any cost differences. For that we develop a simple model extension
that identifies one powerful reason why funding policies are likely to be less expensive to the
government.
Broadly speaking we can distinguish two types of costs. First there are administrative costs
of running a subsidy program; our theory has nothing to say about that. Second there is the
problem of appropriately targeting the program to the right recipients. Of particular interest
here is the question of whether subsidies go to economic agents that do not deliver the desired
outcomes.
In our base model we assume that every entrepreneur that enters obtains funding. In reality
we would no expect all entrepreneurs to pass the various screening processes used by angel
investors. Let us therefore consider a simple model extension where entrepreneurs first enter,
and then get screened before obtaining funding. Assume that there are two types of ventures. A
fraction γ are good ones that generate a return y with probability ρ, and a fraction 1− γ are bad
ones that never generate any returns. For simplicity we assume that entrepreneurs do not know
their type when making the entry decision, but that ‘smart’ angel investors can tell them apart.
We thus need to distinguish between the total number of entrepreneurs that enter (nE), and the
total number of entrepreneurs that are worthy of obtaining funding (nGE = γnE).
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Our focus here is the effectiveness of the two policies. Suppose the government has a budget
B that can be allocated between founding and funding subsidies. Assume that there is a common
and constant cost ψ of administering subsidies. In the main model, the uptake on those subsidies
is given by n∗ESE and n
∗
ESI , so thatB = n
∗
E(SE+SI)(1+ψ). We can now consider the effect of
investor screening. The founding subsidy SE is given to all projects nE , irrespective of whether
they are good or bad. The funding subsidy SI , however, only applies to good projects nGE ,
because smart investors will never invest in bad projects. This suggests that funding subsidies
are more targeted, because they only apply to those ventures that pass the investor screen. The
government budget is then given by B = (n∗ESE + γn
∗
ESI)(1 + ψ). We immediately recognize
that founding policies are more expensive to the government than funding policies. This is
because founding policies apply to an earlier stage of the entrepreneurial value creation process,
where there is less selection. Consequently, large amounts of subsidies are spent on recipients
that never generate the intended economic benefits. This simple model extension therefore
provides an additional cost-based rationale for why funding policies may be preferable over
founding policies.
3 Model Discussion
3.1 Implications for Entrepreneurship Policy
This paper aims to raise some fundamental questions about entrepreneurship policies. In this
section we discuss some of the broader implications of our analysis. We start by looking at
entrepreneurship policies within a single ecosystem.
Our analysis emphasizes the dynamic aspect of entrepreneurship policies, and the process
by which ecosystems are built over time. This approach contrasts with parts of the ecosystems
literature which emphasizes the interaction between a diverse set of players, focusing on ‘cross-
sectional’ rather than ‘longitudinal’ aspects of ecosystem developments. The cross-sectional
literature focuses on the interplay between entrepreneurs, different types of investors, universi-
ties and research labs, established corporations, stock markets, supply chains, service providers,
and so on. Our goal here is to add a dynamic component to the analysis. Specifically we argue
that some of the critical components of an entrepreneurial ecosystem can only be grown over
time. The underlying premise is that one of the required inputs for building entrepreneurial
ventures is a type of tacit knowledge that can only be acquired through direct experience of
the entrepreneurial process. The key novelty of our analysis is the intergenerational linkage:
the fact that younger generations of entrepreneurs benefit from the experience of previous gen-
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erations, and the fact that over a career, individuals switch from being the key promoter (the
entrepreneur), to being a key input provider (the investor).
Our dynamic perspective of looking at the accumulation of experiential expertise has im-
mediate policy implications. First and foremost, any short-term evaluation of entrepreneurship
policies is fundamentally incomplete and possibly misguided. An evaluation of entrepreneur-
ship policies requires a long-term perspective, and needs to focus on the accumulation of ex-
pertise and experience as a key metric. While this becomes apparent in our model, we would
argue that current practice is far away. Most entrepreneurship policies are measured either on
the basis of how much entrepreneurial activity they encourage, or how successful that activity
is. Concretely, most entrepreneurship programs are evaluated either in terms of direct inputs
– how much money is invested in how many companies – or direct outputs – how many com-
panies succeed, and how many jobs do they create. Our dynamic perspective challenges these
approaches by arguing that a key metric for evaluating entrepreneurship policies is how much
they add to the stock of accumulated experience that can be leveraged by the next generation of
entrepreneurs. Admittedly this presents a significant measurement challenge, as it requires data
about the career paths of the individuals in the supported ventures, and how they contribute to
the ecosystem after exiting from these ventures.10
One interesting finding in our model is that even the simplest specification of intergenera-
tional linkages immediately generates multiple equilibria. This paper is by no means the first
to recognize the possibility of multiple equilibria in the market between entrepreneurs and in-
vestors (see Michelacci and Suarez (2004) and Landier (2006)). The novelty here is that the
multiplicity of equilibria does not stem from a standard coordination problem where one side
of the market needs the other side to do something; instead it comes from the dynamics of how
expertise accumulates over time. To be precise, in our model there is actually a unique equilib-
rium in every period, and therefore no coordination problem. However, there can be multiple
steady state equilibria to which the period equilibria converge to over time. The challenge here
is not to bring together different players to coordinate; the challenge here is to dynamically
build sufficient expertise for the ecosystem to become self-sustaining.
This dynamic perspective has important implications for entrepreneurship policy. Our model
suggests different roles for governments in more versus less advanced ecosystems. In a high
equilibrium there is a role for the government because of a fundamental intertemporal external-
ity: future generations benefit from the entrepreneurial experiences of past generations. Pro-
10To give an example, the full economic impact of Paypal concerns not only the company itself, but also the
so-called ‘Paypal mafia’ – the people that came out of Paypal, and became involved with companies as diverse as
Facebook, SpaceX, Airbnb, Uber, and many others (see Forrest (2014)).
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vided the costs to the government are not too high, the optimal government policy involves
some permanent support of entrepreneurial activities. In a low equilibrium, there is an addi-
tional rationale for government support, namely to help the economy move from the low to the
high equilibrium. In the model we show that this requires lifting the economy to a minimum
threshold of entrepreneurial activity, to set it onto a self-sustaining dynamic upwards path. The
most interesting implication is that this calls for a set of temporary government policies. That
is, apart from the steady state logic of an intergenerational externality, there is a temporary
catalytic logic for entrepreneurship policies. A practical implication is that policy makers are
faced with the additional challenges of identifying where such critical threshold might lie, and
how to implement temporary policies that are credibly phased out as the economy moves onto
a self-sustaining dynamic path.
This paper looks at the trade-off between two canonical classes of entrepreneurship poli-
cies: founding and funding policies. We focus on these two policies because they represent two
important and clearly distinct classes of entrepreneurship policies. Our model of founding sub-
sidies is a stylized depiction of a large set of ‘demand-side’ policies, i.e., policies that encourage
more entrepreneurial entry (and hence the ‘demand’ for capital). Across the globe there exist
a large number of policies that encourage people to become entrepreneurs, consisting of a va-
riety of skills training and mentoring services. Closely related, there are numerous policies for
facilitating the initial steps of starting a business, such as business accelerators and incubation
facilities. Another broad class of policies that fit our model of founding subsidies are commer-
cialization grants that push technologies out of universities (and other research institutions) into
the market.
We contrast these demand-side founding subsidies with funding policies that encourage the
supply of capital to entrepreneurial ventures. We model this policy as an investment tax credit
for investors. The fundamental ‘tax incidence equivalence’ theorem implies that our subsidy
can also be interpreted as a tax credit to the entrepreneurial venture. R&D tax credits, for
example, can thus also be interpreted as funding subsidies in our current model – a slightly
richer model would be required to distinguish R&D versus investment tax credits. Finally,
as discussed in Section 2.7, our funding subsidy can also be understood in terms of a return
subsidy, which can be interpreted as capital gains holidays, or corporate income tax breaks.
Despite its simplicity (or indeed because of it), our model therefore captures a large swath of
entrepreneurship policies.
The finding that funding policies ultimately benefit entrepreneurs more than founding poli-
cies, is not immediately obvious. One might have expected that demand-side subsidies are more
favorable to entrepreneurs than supply-side subsidies. This is where proper modeling of market
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dynamics is needed. Our analysis of equilibrium market valuations reveals a new but intuitive
logic: founding policies generate more entrepreneurs chasing money, whereas funding policies
generate more investors chasing deals (see Gompers and Lerner (2000), Hellmann and Thiele
(2014), Inderst and Müller (2004)).
Another important insight is that policies for entrepreneurs do not behave in the same way
as in more conventional markets. Our benchmark model represents a conventional ‘Walrasian’
market with well-behaved demand and supply functions. For this model we prove a fundamen-
tal equivalence result, namely that a unit of subsidy spent on the demand-side has the same
effect as a unit of subsidy spent on the supply-side. Moving from the benchmark to the inter-
generational model, we show that the long-term supply of capital to entrepreneurial ventures
does not behave like a conventional supply function. This is because funding entrepreneurial
ventures requires tacit knowledge that is acquired through experiencing the entrepreneurship
process itself. In other words, the supply of capital depends on angel investors who are success-
ful entrepreneurs from past generations. This insight fundamentally changes how we should
think about long-term policies for promoting entrepreneurship. The equivalence of founding
and funding policies is broken, because the two policies leave different legacies. Relative to
founding policies, funding policies allow entrepreneurs to retain a larger ownership fraction,
create more entrepreneurial wealth, and thereby increase the future supply of angel capital.
3.2 Some Open Economy Considerations
Our model naturally lends itself to discuss some open economy aspects of entrepreneurship
policies. The main model considers a single economy, or ecosystem, in isolation; we can think
of that as a country or a region within a country. We now discuss how one ecosystem may
interact with other ecosystems. Of particularly interest is the question of how an economy, that
is trapped in a relatively low equilibrium, might benefit from a high equilibrium economy. This
gets at the heart of the ‘Silicon envy’ problem mentioned in the introduction. We consider both
capital and labor mobility, looking at the role of foreign investors that might want to invest in a
low equilibrium ecosystem, and looking at the threat of brain drain, where entrepreneurs from
a low equilibrium economy relocate to a high equilibrium economy.
Relatively little is known about cross-border angel investing, but the empirical evidence on
venture capital suggests that foreign investors play a considerable role in many less developed
markets (see Aizenman and Kendall (2012)). An interesting case study is Israel (Avnimelech
et al. (2005), Senor and Singer (2009)) which explicitly attracted foreign investors, mostly
from the US, to jump-start its entrepreneurial ecosystem. Our model can be used to analyze the
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dynamic effects of attracting foreign investors. In fact, one natural interpretation of the external
angels in our model is that they are foreign investors, who acquired their expertise by being
successful entrepreneurs in a high equilibrium ecosystem.
Presumably there are costs to investing in a more distant and less familiar environment, so
why would foreign investors even look at low equilibrium ecosystems? Our model captures a
simple but important reason for foreign investors to consider making such investments. Figure
5 reveals that investors get a higher ownership stake in the low equilibrium economy than for
comparable deals in a high equilibrium economy.11
Our model makes some interesting predictions about market dynamics when a low equilib-
rium ecosystem opens itself up to foreign investors. Consider an exogenous increase in external
angels. Panel A of Figure 5 shows the effect of a small infusion of foreign capital, so that the
low equilibrium continues to exist. Panel B shows the effect of a larger infusion where the low
equilibrium disappears.
We are interested in the dynamics of how an ecosystem that starts in a low equilibrium
changes over time. Let us focus on a large foreign investment shock, as depicted in Panel B of
Figure 5. Initially the majority of deals is funded by foreign investors. These first-generation
foreign-funded ventures create some successful domestic entrepreneurs who now begin to in-
vest as entrepreneurial angels into the next generation of entrepreneurs. Over time the foreign
investors are thus joined by more and more domestic entrepreneurial angels. As the econ-
omy moves towards the high equilibrium, the fraction of ventures funded by foreign angels de-
creases. This is because there are more domestic entrepreneurial angels, and because over time
valuations increase, making the ecosystem less attractive to foreign investors. As the economy
approaches the high equilibrium, foreign investors no longer play a large role, as the ecosystem
is able to sustain itself on the basis of its home-grown entrepreneurial angels.
This simple dynamic theory has immediate policy implications, suggesting potential ben-
efits of opening up a low equilibrium ecosystem to experienced foreign investors. Moreover,
funding policies to promote entrepreneurship do not need to be restricted to domestic investors,
but could also be made available to foreign investors. The main concern is that the economic
activity of the underlying ventures remains in the domestic ecosystem.
This bring us to the second open economy issue: the problem of brain drain. So far we
focused on the flow of capital from the high to the low equilibrium ecosystem, but there is also
11This is consistent with the empirical observation that valuations are higher in Silicon Valley than elsewhere,
as reported by Angellist (2016). Obviously such descriptive evidence is indicative but not conclusive, as there
are likely differences in the quality of ventures across ecosystems. In addition, there is some anecdotal evidence
that companies, that move from elsewhere to Silicon Valley, obtain higher valuations there (see, for example,
Burn-Callander (2015)).
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the possibility of human capital moving from the low to the high equilibrium ecosystem. Our
model adds some interesting insights to this debate. For one, it matters when people leave: prior
to entry, past entry but before obtaining funding, or after funding? Our analysis suggests that
in the early stages of the entrepreneurial process, entrepreneurs take more from the ecosystem
than they give back to it. They require money and expertise that is in short supply, and they
benefit from various government subsidies. Payback occurs when entrepreneurs succeed and
reinvest their financial returns back into the ecosystem. Consequently, the worst type of brain
drain is actually when entrepreneurs start their ventures domestically, take advantage of all
the subsidies, then move abroad, and never come back. This insight has two important policy
implications.
First, brain drain generates another difference between founding and funding policies, namely
that founding policies are more exposed to brain drain. Specifically, if there is some probability
of leaving at each stage of the entrepreneurial process, then founding subsidies are given to a
larger number of entrepreneurs that subsequently leave the domestic ecosystem. This argument
is very similar to the screening argument from Section 2.8. One possible remedy is to make
(founding and funding) subsidies conditional on entrepreneurs keeping their economic activity
in the domestic economy, at least for some length of time. That is, the government might want
to retain the right to claw back subsidies in case of early departures.
Second, there is the issue of whether entrepreneurs that were successful abroad ever come
back home? The natural inclination for many entrepreneurial angels is to invest in the ecosystem
where they succeeded, because this is where their expertise and networks are fresh. However,
there is also the possibility that successful entrepreneurs come back to their country of origin.
Saxenian (2002, 2006) argues that some of the success of countries like Taiwan was partly based
on the government’s efforts to lure back Taiwanese-born entrepreneurs that had been success-
ful in the US. There are also private sector initiatives to bringing back entrepreneurial talents.
Universities, for example, can do this through their alumni network. Business networking orga-
nizations like C100, an association of Canadians in Silicon Valley, play a similar role.
3.3 Implications for Further Research
Our theory relates to existing empirical evidence, generates a host of new empirical predictions,
and inspires interesting avenues for further empirical research. We group our discussion into
three themes: (i) the behavior of entrepreneurial angels, (ii) the effect of entrepreneurship
policies, and (iii) open economy issues.
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Our model highlights the importance of entrepreneurial experience for angel investing. This
suggests a more systematic empirical investigation of the behavior of these key individuals.
There is the question of who becomes an angel investor. Consider the set of founders, man-
agers, and key employees of successful ventures that experienced a successful exit, be it an
acquisition or an IPO. The question is what do they do next? An empirical analysis could look
at the incidence and determinants of these individuals becoming angel investors, as well as
serial entrepreneurs (effectively investing in their own ventures). Also, our model looks at valu-
ations and tax credits as determinants of the propensity to make angel investments; an empirical
analysis might uncover further important determinants. The work of Cumming et al. (2016) is
an interesting step in this direction.
A complementary approach is to consider a representative sample of angel investors, and
look at the behaviors of different types of angels. Our model is based on the premise that prior
entrepreneurial experience imbues angel investors with useful tacit knowledge. This opens up
new avenues for empirically investigating how entrepreneurial angels differ from their non-
entrepreneurial peers: Do they select different types of companies, at different stages? Do they
become more actively involved in these companies, provide different advice, or make different
decisions? And do they achieve better investment outcomes?
Our analysis calls for further empirical studies of entrepreneurship policies. At the core of
our theory is a relative evaluation of alternative entrepreneurship policies. Currently the most
common type of empirical analyses of entrepreneurship policies concerns program evaluations,
which involve picking a single program in isolation and asking whether it achieves its objectives
(see, for example, Gans and Stern (2003), Hellmann and Schure (2010), Lerner (1999), or
Zhao and Ziedonis (2012)). However, our theory suggests a more ambitious empirical agenda.
Beyond individual program evaluations, policy makers need to think about policy design. This
involves a relative comparison of the effects of alternative policies. The analysis in Section
2.8 suggests that one of the challenges here is that different policies are applied to different
populations of firms (or in fact individuals), at different stages of the entrepreneurial process.
Another important challenge is that policies interact with each other, prompting questions to
what extent different policies complement or substitute each other.
There is ample room for research on open economy aspects of entrepreneurship policies.
A first set of questions relates to the role of foreign investors. Some prior literature explores
when venture capitalists invest abroad and how (see Bottazzi et al. (2016), or Chemmanur et
al. (2016)). The current model suggests going one step further and asking how these foreign
investments affect domestic ecosystem development. A second set of empirical questions con-
cerns brain drain. Surprisingly little is known about this: Which entrepreneurs leave? Under
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what circumstances, and at what stage? Where do they go? And what effect does government
policy have on their decisions, directly and indirectly? A third issue concerns the return of de-
parted entrepreneurs. While there is some empirical work on immigrant entrepreneurship (Kerr
and Kerr, 2016), less is known about the flip side, i.e., the role of emigrant entrepreneurs (see,
however, Agrawal et al. (2006) for some related work on patent citations). An empirical anal-
ysis of how successful emigrant entrepreneurs contribute to their home country, making angel
investments and helping in other ways, could generate important insights into the long-term
nature of the brain drain phenomenon.
Finally we briefly note that our model also opens up new avenues for further theoretical re-
search. First, we believe that while our analysis identifies two important classes of entrepreneur-
ship policies, future research could delve deeper into the details of these policies. Within each of
our two policy categories there are interesting nuances between different policies; and beyond
our two categories, there are many other entrepreneurship policies not considered here. Second,
our analysis of intergenerational linkages focuses on one specific link, namely the transition of
successful entrepreneurs to become angel investors. Future research might consider additional
intergenerational linkages, such as the role of failed entrepreneurs. Third, a complete analysis
of the open economy implications of entrepreneurship policies remains beyond the scope of
this paper. Consequently we believe there is room for a more comprehensive analysis of the
equilibrium flows of human and financial capital across ecosystems.
4 Conclusion
This paper builds a formal model of the market for financing entrepreneurial ventures, to ex-
amine the effects of two canonical entrepreneurship policies: founding policies that encourage
entry by entrepreneurs, and funding policies that encourage financing by investors. The model
recognizes the importance of tacit knowledge for investing in entrepreneurial ventures, and ar-
gues that this is mainly acquired through prior entrepreneurial experience. The supply of capital
is therefore dependent on the wealth generated by prior generations of entrepreneurs. We show
that this has a profound influence on the market equilibrium, and the impact of entrepreneurship
policies.
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